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MacColl’s influences on Peirce and Schröder
Irving H. Anellis
Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, USA
Résumé : Les contributions à la logique de MacColl et Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839-1914) ont été les deux plus profondes influences sur le travail de Ernst
Schröder (1841-1902) en logique algébrique. Dans son Vorlesungen über die
Algebra der Logik, Schröder a cité MacColl comme l’un de ses précurseurs
les plus importants. Schröder a comparé les travaux de Peirce avec les pre-
mières parties de la série d’articles intitulés « The calculus of equivalent state-
ments » que MacColl publie entre 1877 et 1880. Schröder a attribué la priorité
à MacColl pour avoir anticipé les résultats de Peirce. Pour Schröder, MacColl
était une phase préliminaire à l’algèbre de la logique de Peirce.
Abstract: The contributions to logic of MacColl and Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839-1914) were the two most profound influences upon the work of Ernst
Schröder (1841-1902) in algebraic logic. In his Vorlesungen über die Algebra
der Logik, Schröder referred to MacColl as one of his most important pre-
cursors. Schröder compared Peirce’s considerations with the early parts of
MacColl’s series of papers “The calculus of equivalent statements” (published
between 1877 and 1880), and he attributed to MacColl priority for having an-
ticipated Peirce’s results. For Schröder, MacColl’s calculus was a preliminary
stage of Peirce’s algebra of logic.
Introduction
Hugh MacColl (1837-1909) was originally a mathematician, who gradually
turned towards logic. He contributed to propositional logic, to nonclassical
logic, especially modal logic, and the theory of inference. He suggested propo-
sitions and implication as the basis for logic, being among the first, if not the
first, to articulate the modern conception of implication, introducing the terms
“implication” and “non-implication” in the second installment of “The Calculus
of equivalent statements” [MacColl 1877-1878b, 181]. Towards the end of his
career, he engaged in debate with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in the pages
of Mind on the existential import of propositions. In his review of MacColl’s
Symbolic Logic [Russell 1906], Russell wrote:
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He is primarily concerned with implication, not with inclusion; his
formulæ state that one statement implies another, not (directly)
that one class is contained in another. The relation of inclusion
between classes is for him derivative, being in fact the relation
of implication between the statement that a thing belongs to the
one class, and the statement that it belongs to the other. He was,
I believe, the first to found symbolic logic on propositions and
implication, and in this respect he seems to me to have made an
important advance upon his predecessors. [Russell 1906, 255]
And in his manuscript on “Recent Italian work on the foundations of mathe-
matics” (1901), Russell, contrasting the conception of the algebraic logicians
with that of MacColl and Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), wrote that:
Formal Logic is concerned in the main and primarily with the re-
lation of implication between propositions. What this relation
is, it is impossible to define: in all accounts of Peano’s logic
it appears as one of his indefinables. It has been one of the
bad effects of the analogy with ordinary Algebra that most for-
mal logicians (with the exception of Frege and Mr. MacColl)
have shown more interest in logical equations than in implication.
[Russell 1993, 353]
MacColl carried out his work in isolation and independence from the leading
logicians of his day. Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847-1930), a former student
of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), remarked in “On some characteristics
of symbolic logic,” for example, that “Nothing is stranger in the recent his-
tory of Logic in England, than the non-recognition which has befallen the
writings of the author [H. MacColl]” [Ladd-Franklin 1889, 562]. This does
not mean that his work was entirely unknown, however. There were refer-
ences to his work by a few leading logicians; Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932)
in his Arithmetices Principia, Nova Methodo Exposita [Peano 1889, ivn] and
Formulaire de mathématique acknowledged a debt to MacColl’s work in propo-
sitional logic, in particular employing results [Peano 1901, v, 13–14, 16, 19–21,
226] from MacColl’s “Calculus of equivalent statements” [MacColl 1877-1878a,
1878-1879]. This led Russell to write that “Peano, like McColl, at first re-
garded propositions as more fundamental than classes. . . ” [Russell 1903, 13],
and Louis Couturat (1868-1914) worked on his propositional logic, without,
however, taking account of either MacColl’s modal logic or probability logic
[Couturat 1899, 621].
MacColl is indubitably best known to historians and philosophers of logic
for his exchanges with Bertrand Russell in the pages of Mind on the prob-
lem of the existential import of propositions. He has also received attention
from those interested in the history of nonclassical logics because of his criti-
cisms, related to the question of existential import, of the accepted definition of
material implication. Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), for example, had strongly
praised Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) for the courage to challenge in print
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Russell’s use of material implication in Principia Mathematica [Wiener 1916,
656], while Lewis himself criticized all logicians for adhering to the classical
conception of implication as material implication, while explicitly exempting
only MacColl [Lewis 1912]. 1 MacColl’s definition of the syllogism as an infer-
ence defined in terms of implication, however, was perhaps his more significant
contribution to the over-all development of logic. This translation of the syllo-
gism as an implication was a crucial step in establishing propositional logic in
its modern form, and was adopted by such widely scattered logicians as Peirce
and Russell.
Whereas George Boole (1815-1864) had tended to limit the interpretation
of his logic to the calculus of classes, MacColl’s first contribution to logic was
to admit not only a class interpretation, but a propositional interpretation.
He indeed gave preference to the propositional interpretation because of its
generality, and called it “pure logic.” Most of MacColl’s work proceeded in an
extensive series of journal articles. But in Symbolic Logic and its Applications
(1906), he published the final version of his logic(s). There, propositions are
qualified as either certain, impossible, contingent, true or false.
The contributions to logic of MacColl and Peirce were the two most pro-
found influences upon the work on Ernst Schröder (1841-1902) in algebraic
logic, and in his Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik [Schröder 1890-1905].
Volker Peckhaus, who counted the number of references to Peirce and MacColl
in the Vorlesungen, noted that, whereas Peirce was cited most often, MacColl
was the second most cited author [Peckhaus 1998, 20]. So far as Schröder
was concerned, MacColl’s calculus held, in Peckhaus’s words, “the status of a
preliminary stage of Peirce’s algebra of logic” [Peckhaus 1998, 20].
Peckhaus has already dealt in substantial detail with Schröder’s views of
MacColl, and of MacColl’s impact upon Schröder’s work in logic [Peckhaus
1998]. I shall, therefore, concentrate my discussion on Peirce’s views of
MacColl, and of the influences which MacColl’s work exerted upon Peirce. It
is, however, worth repeating, as [Peckhaus 2004, 584] also noted, that Schröder
explicitly expressed his agreement with John Venn (1834-1923) regarding the
close similarity between Peirce’s and Schröder’s work and MacColl’s.
MacColl’s influences on Schröder
Schröder’s own techniques were primarily modifications of Peirce’s, and
the logical system of the Algebra der Logik can be understood as a unifica-
tion, systematization, and development of Peirce’s logic and an extension of
1. [Read 1998, 59–60] notes that for the later edition of his Survey, Lewis [Lewis
1960] excised nearly all of the material discussing his early work on systems of strict
implication, which included the early references to the work of MacColl and re-
marking on his indebtedness to MacColl. He argued by way of justification for the
wholesale abridgment that the early Lewis-Langford logic of strict implication had
been superseded.
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Peirce’s algebra of relatives—and, Schröder would also claim, improvement,
of Peirce’s logic. Schröder, Peckhaus reminds us, “always compared Peirce’s
considerations with the early parts of MacColl’s series of papers “The Calculus
of Equivalent Statements” published between 1877 and 1880, and he conceded
to MacColl priority when he had anticipated Peirce’s results” [Peckhaus 1998,
20]. Taking this seriously, we must examine the extant evidence to determine
the extent to which MacColl is to be understood as a precursor of Peirce and
the nature of the influences which MacColl’s work exerted on Peirce’s own
work in logic.
Peckhaus identifies three aspects in which Schröder was influenced by
MacColl, either directly or through Peirce [Peckhaus 1998, 20–21]. (1) In
investigating the comparative abilities of various calculi to eliminate terms
and resolve logical formulas, Schröder compared his own procedure, adapted
from Boole’s, with Peirce’s. Peirce’s was taken as the natural way to op-
erate, and MacColl’s method, which Schröder investigated in extenso, was
considered to be a “preliminary stage” of Peirce’s. (2) Schröder explicitly ac-
knowledged MacColl’s priority in formulating propositional logic, terming it
the “MacColl-Peircean propositional logic.” Schröder was, however, critical of
their purported efforts to base logic upon the calculus of propositions, argu-
ing that his founding of the propositional calculus upon the calculi of domains
(Denkbereiche) and classes was more general. It must be noted that Schröder’s
criticism applies to Peirce only to the extent that he undertook to generalize
Boole’s efforts to formulate the categorical syllogisms of Aristotle as chains of
propositions whose fundamental connective was implication. But once Peirce
undertook to treat his primary connective, illation, the so-called “claw,” as
interpretable as any transitive, reflexive, and asymmetric relation, holding be-
tween either terms, propositions, relations, classes, or sets, depending upon the
context in which the formulas occurred, this criticism could no longer, strictly,
apply. For quantified formulas, only the Boolean part of formulas could be
treated strictly as propositions. (3) Awarding priority to MacColl and Peirce
for defining material implication, Schröder adopted that definition for his own
propositional calculus. Setting aside the question of priority, Schröder after
proving his exposition of MacColl’s work [Schröder 1890-1905, I, 589–592], ex-
presses his agreement with John Venn that MacColl’s method is “practically
identical with those of Peirce and Schröder” [Venn 1881, 414; 1894, 492]. To
appreciate Schröder’s positive attitude towards MacColl, it is perhaps suffi-
cient to recall Schröder’s testimony, in the first volume of the Vorlesungen
über die Algebra der Logik [Schröder 1890-1905, I, 560] that he accounted only
MacColl’s and Peirce’s methods equal to his own in their proficiency. The ad-
vantage that Schröder identified in the logical systems of Peirce and MacColl
over those of Venn and William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), is the greater
naturalness and simplicity of the former [Schröder 1890-1905, I, 573]. His
quibble with the “MacColl-Peircean propositional logic” was its lengthiness,
and he undertook in the pages that followed [Schröder 1890-1905, I, 574–584]
to repair that defect by modifying Peirce’s methods as presented in Peirce’s
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“On the algebra of logic” [Peirce 1880, 37–42]. Schröder’s changing attitude
towards MacColl’s work is summed up by Shahid Rahman and Juan Redmond
as follows: “Ernst Schröder, who in his famous Vorlesungen über die Algebra
der Logik quotes and extensively discusses MacColl’s contributions, first had
quite a negative impression of MacColl’s innovations though later he seems to
have changed his mind, conceding that MacColl’s algebra has a higher degree
of generality and simplicity in particular in contexts of applied logic. What
Schröder definitively rejects is MacColl’s propositional interpretation of the
Aristotelian Syllogistic” [Schröder 2008, 538]. Peckhaus [Peckhaus 1998, 30] is
led to think that Schröder learned of MacColl’s work indirectly, through ref-
erences by Peirce, but notes as well that Schröder, treating MacColl primarily
as historical, consistently acknowledges MacColl nonetheless as a predecessor
of Peirce’s and his own work. One of the principal and most severe failures of
MacColl’s system is the limitation imposed by his failure to introduce a fully
fledged apparatus for quantifiers into the system, rendering his system far less
flexible than Peirce’s and Schröder’s, and ensursing that it would remain a
propositional logic only. 2
MacColl’s influences on Peirce
MacColl developed a propositional logic within a general Boolean frame-
work in the second installment of his paper “The calculus of equivalent state-
ments” [MacColl 1877-1878b], and provided an example and exposition of what
he called “tabular logic” (“ logique tabulaire”) in his 1902 article of that title
in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale [MacColl 1902a]. In his interpre-
tation, as expressed in the opening of the first installment of “The calculus
of equivalent statements,” A = 1 means that the statement A is true; A = 0
that it is false [MacColl 1877-1878a, 9]. The second installment opens with
the explanation that the expression A ∶ B means that statement A implies
statement B, i.e. in any case if A is true, then B is true [MacColl 1877-
1878b, 177]. In the third installment, MacColl enumerated what he consid-
ered to be the three principal differences between his development of logic
and Boole’s and Jevons’s [MacColl 1878-1879, 27]. They are that (1) ev-
ery letter, as well as every combination of letters, signifies a statement; (2)
that he introduces the symbol ‘∶’ to denote that the statment following it is
true, provided the statement preceding it is true; and (3) he introduces a
special symbol for negation, which may be applied, depending upon circum-
2. Whether modal operators, with MacColl’s ‘quasi-modal’ values of certain, im-
possible, contingent, true or false, could or should have been reconstituted as fully
fledged quantifiers, in line with Russell’s interpretation of universally quantified
propositions as necessary and existentially quantified propositions as possible, is crit-
ical, but beyond the scope of our present concern, and it is, moreover, moot, since
MacColl did not adopt that option; see [Anellis 2009, 154] and [Rahman & Redmond
2008, 543–544].
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stances, to any number of terms, or even a complex statement. For our partic-
ular purposes, the second innovation is crucial for distinguishing the classical
Boolean algebra from the symbolic logic of MacColl in its more significant
aspect because it introduces implication as the principal connective of the sys-
tem (along with negation), and can be seen in this sense as closely related to
Schröder’s subsumption [Peckhaus 2004, 584]. It differs significantly, however,
from Peirce’s (and Schröder’s) introduction of implication into the algebra of
logic, given that, as here defined by MacColl, it amounts to strict implication,
whereas Peirce had adopted material implication, together with negation, as
his main connectives.
Although remembered today primarily, when at all, for his discussions
with Russell on the nature of propositions and their existential import—to the
extent that Max Fisch and Atwell Turquette thought that Peirce might have
been led to work out a triadic logic by the debate between MacColl and Russell
on the nature of implication [Fisch & Turquette 1966, 82–83]—MacColl was in
his day a respected member of the logical community, taking his position in the
competition for the best (most effective) logical system. Schröder’s comparison
of the procedures for solving logical problems provided by different logical
systems, in particular the different ways of solving Boole’s famous “Example 5,”
is discussed. MacColl’s work demonstrates the importance of the organon
aspect of symbolic logic. We have:
Ex. 5. Let the observation of a class of natural productions be
supposed to have led to the following general results.
1st, That in whichsoever of these productions the properties A
and C are missing, the property E is found, together with one of
the properties B and D, but not with both.
2nd, That wherever the properties A and D are found while E is
missing, the properties B and C will either both be found or both
be missing.
3rd, That wherever the property A is found in conjunction with
either B or E, or both of them, there either the property C or
the property D will be found, but not both of them. And con-
versely, wherever the property C or D is found singly, there the
property A will be found in conjunction with either B or E, or
both of them.
Let it then be required to ascertain, first, what in any particu-
lar instance may be concluded from the ascertained presence of
the property A, with reference to the properties B, C, and D;
also whether any relations exist independently among the prop-
erties B, C, and D. Secondly, what may be concluded in like
manner respecting the property B, and the properties A, C, and
D. [Boole 1854, 146]
In an entry into his Logic Notebook for 14 November 1865 (see MS 114 of
Peirce’s Logic Notebook of 1865-1909, published in [Peirce 1982, 337]), Peirce
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first declared that there is “no difference logically between hypotheticals and
categoricals,” and that “[t]he subject, is a sign of the predicate, the antecedent
of the consequent,” thus virtually, if not yet actually, equating the copula of
predication with implication and opening the way to eventually represent the
syllogism “All S are M , AllM are S, Therefore all S are P ” as (S ⊃M)&(M ⊃
P ) ⊃ (S ⊃ P ). This translation is, as we noted, strongly suggested in [Peirce
1870], and also, independently, ten years later, by Hugh MacColl in his 1880
paper on “Symbolical Reasoning,” where he wrote in his Definition 3 that:
The symbol ∶, which may be read “implies,” asserts that the state-
ment following it must be true, provided the statement preceding
it be true.
Thus, the expression a ∶ b may be read “a implies b,” or “If a
is true, b must be true,” or “Whenever a is true, b is also true.”
[MacColl 1880a, 50–51]
MacColl followed this up in “Symbolical Reasoning IV,” when he explains that:
from two implicational premisses A ∶ B and B ∶ C draw
implicational conclusion A ∶ C. That is to say [. . . ]
(A ∶ B)(B ∶ C) ∶ (A ∶ C). [MacColl 1902b, 367]
MacColl made this reading more fully explicit, in case it still needed to be
by this time, where he wrote that, in the case, for example, of the Barbara
syllogism “All A are B, All B are C, therefore All A are C,”
In this form the syllogism is true whether premisses or conclusion
be true or false [. . . ] and must, therefore, be classed amongst the
formal certainties. Now a statement is called a formal certainty
when it follows necessarily from our formally stated conventions
as to the meanings of the words or symbols which express it;
and until a language has entered upon the propositional stages
those conventions (or definitions) cannot be formally expressed
and classified. [MacColl 1902b, 368]
For MacColl, there is no distinction between categorical and hypothetical
propositions. 3 This is one of the essential features permitting MacColl, Peirce,
and Venn, and later Bertrand Russell, to understand the syllogism of the
form “All A are B. All B are C. Therefore all A are C” as the implication
[(A ⊃ B)(B ⊃ C)] ⊃ (A ⊃ C). Venn in Symbolic Logic objected to MacColl’s
notation regarding implication, and in particular the appellation “implication,”
however, principally on the ground that MacColl applies the term “implication”
to hypotheticals; “implication,” Venn argued, “implies” that it is known that
there is a connection between the terms, and this is a stricter condition than the
“if. . . then” relation [Venn 1881, 376–378]. Thus Venn’s objection regards not
the treatment of the logical relation which we call “implication,” but rather his
calling it by that name. Ladd-Franklin considered it one of MacColl’s greatest
3. See, e.g. [Rahman 2000].
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accomplishments to define Aristotle’s A-proposition in terms of implication,
writing that “The logic of the non-symmetrical affirmative copula, “all a is b,”
was first worked out by Mr. MacColl” [Ladd-Franklin 1889, 562]. She then
explains that:
Nothing is stranger, in the recent history of Logic in England,
than the non-recognition which has befallen the writings of this
author. The fact that his contributions appeared in a journal
which logicians were not in the habit of referring to (his brief
article in Mind did not do his method justice), the fact that he
was not acquainted with the writings of Boole, and the further
accident that he considered it a matter of importance to read
“all a is b,” which he wrote a ∶ b, in the words, “the statement
that a thing is a implies the statement that it is b,”—all doubt-
less contributed to making him seem foreign to writers trained
in the usual schools of logic. The fact that the nature of the
connection between the terms in “all x is y,” and between the
propositions in “a is b is-always-followed-by c is d,” is exactly the
same, and must be exhibited in the same formal rules of procedure,
has nothing to do with the words in which the proposition and
the sequence may be expressed. But if it had not been for this
accidental misfortune, it seems incredible that English logicians
should not have seen that the entire task accomplished by Boole
has been accomplished by MacColl with far greater conciseness,
simplicity and elegance; and, what is an interesting point, in terms
of that copula which is of by far the most frequent use in daily
life. [sic] [Ladd-Franklin 1889, 562]
MacColl’s preference for multiple-valued, especially triadic logic over bivalent
logic was the subject of criticism by Platon Sergeevich Poretskii (1846-1907), 4
and Jevons [Jevons 1881, 486] among those who challenged his definition of
implication. Nevertheless, MacColl’s contributions to non-classical logic were
more consequential than his work in two-valued logic. His definition of infer-
ence in terms of implication, and his concept of strict implication, aimed at
avoiding the ex falso sequitur quodlibet of the accepted definition of material
implication which he himself had framed, is a precursor to the introduction by
Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) of strict implication [Lewis 1912; 1913].
Whether Peirce had MacColl in mind among those of whom he wrote that:
“The algebra of logic was invented by the celebrated British mathematician
George Boole, and has subsequently been improved by the labors of a number
of writers in England, France, Germany, and America,” [Peirce 2010, 63], can
only be conjectural, since, in the manuscript “Boolian Algebra” of circa 1890
in which Peirce made this comment, no individual names, other than Boole’s,
4. Styazhkin asserts, without supplying citations, that MacColl’s “tendency toward
augmenting two-valued logical formalism with a third truth value. . . evoked many
objections from P. S. Poretskiy” [Styazhkin 1969, 214].
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are mentioned. 5 Neither does he clearly make explicit in this context the
specific improvements that he had in mind, perhaps because the manuscript
in question was intended to serve as an introductory logic textbook rather
than as either a critical or an historical exposition. Instead, we must go to
the manuscript “Boolian algebra—elementary explanations” [Peirce 2000, 5]
of 1886 to achieve an explicit reference by Peirce to MacColl’s work. There
he compares his so-called “claw” of illation as roughly equivalent to MacColl’s
representation, as introduced by MacColl in [MacColl 1877-1878b, 177], of
the connective of implication expressing the relation between antecedent and
consequent. Peirce writes:
In my different publications I have used a sign like Y turned over
on its side, , to signify the relation between the antecedent and
consequent of an hypothetical proposition. It is a very convenient
sign, but as I have no such sign on this typewriter, I shall use a
colon for the same purpose, according to the practice of Mr. Hugh
MacColl. [Peirce 2000, 5]
Peirce had already referred to MacColl’s work in logic a decade earlier, in his
paper “On the algebra of logic” of 1880. This was, in fact, Peirce’s earliest
published reference to MacColl, and it is again, specifically in connection with
MacColl’s use in [MacColl 1877-1878b, 183] of the sign for implication sev-
eral times over in a single proposition. Peirce stresses the role of implication
in connection precisely to MacColl’s Def. 12 [MacColl 1877-1878b, 177]. The
reference to MacColl there occurs in a footnote [Peirce 1880, 24], in which
Peirce writes: “Mr. Hugh McColl (Calculus of Equivalent Statements, Second
Paper, 1878, 183) makes use of the sign of inclusion several times in the same
proposition. He does not, however, give any of the formulæ of this section,”
concluding Peirce’s explanation for the use of his illation in defining the cat-
egorical propositions A, E, I , and O, their Aristotelian transformations, and
the determination of the truth-values of the basic four forms of categorical
propositions. In the same paper, Peirce notes that four different algebraic
methods had been devised for solving problems in the logic of non-relative
terms, namely those of Boole, of Jevons, of Schröder, and of MacColl, to
which he himself added a fifth [Peirce 1880, 37]. Peirce nevertheless finds in
a footnote that MacColl, “apparently having known nothing of logical algebra
except from a jejune account of Boole’s work in Bain’s Logic [1870] published
several papers on a Calculus of Equivalent Statements” [Peirce 1880, 32]. 6
5. We do not know for certain whether Peirce would have accounted MacColl
among the British, the French, or British residing in France. In any event, since
Peirce here gives no names, he could possibly have had in mind either Louis Liard
(1846-1917), whose work included studies of Jevons’ and Boole’s contribution to logic
[Liard 1877a; 1877b], as well as a wider survey of British work in algebra of logic [Liard
1878], or the Belgian Joseph-Rémi Léopold Delboeuf (1831-1896), author of “Logique
algorithmique” [Delboeuf 1876].
6. The footnote in question runs half a page long. Only the final two sentences
refer to MacColl, and explicitly to [MacColl 1877-1878b]. In that note, Peirce wrote in
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In fact, MacColl testified in the second installment of his “The calculus
of equivalent statements” [MacColl 1877-1878b, 178] that he had not read
Boole’s work. Peirce in a footnote likewise noted that, as a consequence of
his unfamiliarity with the latest work in algebraic logic beyond that gleaned
from the sophomoric account by Alexander Bain (1818-1903), MacColl’s con-
tributions to logic there was based upon “nothing but the Boolian algebra,
with Jevons’s addition and a sign of inclusion” [Peirce 1880, 32]. It was not
until after his “Bainsian” treatment of Boole’s logic that MacColl became di-
rectly acquainted with Boole’s work, and in particular with Boole’s Laws of
Thought (1854). This came about through the good offices of Robert Harley
(1828-1910), who loaned him a copy of that work [MacColl 1878-1879, 27]. 7
Schröder, for his part, suggested that the five methods referred to by Peirce
could, in fact, be reduced to three, because his own was a modification of
Boole’s, which thereby became obsolesent [Schröder 1890-1905, I, 559], while
Peirce’s and MacColl’s were essentially sufficiently similar to permit their re-
duction to, or combination into, one, the “MacColl-Peircean” [Schröder 1890-
1905, I, 589]. MacColl, on the other hand, claimed the superiority of his
methods over that of the “Boolian Logicians” for solving certain logical and
mathematical problems, specifically those that involve questions of probabil-
ity, and he indicated that his logic was developed explicitly in response to
questions about probability [Rahman & Redmond 2008, 556]. 8
The explanations for MacColl’s lack of direct familiarity with the work of
Boole and the other algebraic logicians, and for the relatively insubstantial
knowledge which he had of Boole’s logic were, first, his comparative isolation
from the small circle of investigators in algebraic logic, 9 his limited linguistic
knowledge, on account of which he was unable to read much of the work of his
contemporaries and immediate predecessors [Grattan-Guinness 1998, 10], and
his insubstantial mathematical background relative to that shared by the ma-
jority of algebraic logicians of that period, achieving only a B.A. in mathemat-
ics from the University of London in 1876. Despite this, and in particular, we
full: “Later in the same year, Mr. Hugh McColl, apparently having known nothing of
logical algebra except from a jejune account of Boole’s work in Bain’s Logic, published
several papers on a Calculus of Equivalent Statements, the basis of which is nothing
but the Boolian algebra, with Jevons’s addition and a sign of inclusion. Mr. McColl
adds an exceedingly ingenious application of this algebra to the transformation of
definite integrals” [Peirce 1880, 32].
7. Interestingly, and perhaps not merely coincidently, Harley performed a similar
service for Jevons, by reporting [Jevons 1877, xxi] that Leibniz had anticipated Boole’s
laws of logical notation, and noting additionally that Boole had been informed about
Leibniz’s work by Robert Leslie Ellis (1817-1859) a year after Boole published his
Laws of Thought.
8. See [MacColl 1881] for his negative appraisal of Peirce’s conception of proba-
bility.
9. Thus, in a letter of 1905 to Bertrand Russell, MacColl complained: “I feel myself
an Ishmael among logicians, with my hand against every man, and every man’s hand
against me” (quoted in [Astroh 1998, 142]).
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might add, despite MacColl’s scanty mathematical background, Peirce judged,
indirectly referring to [MacColl 1877-1878a] that “Mr. McColl [sic] adds an ex-
ceedingly ingenious application of the algebra to the transformation of definite
integrals” [Peirce 1880, 32]. MacColl devised his techniques so as to apply his
logical calculus to the theory of limits in an effort to expand and develop the
logical system as a proper analog of algebra. Specifically, as [Grattan-Guinness
1998, 7] noted, referring to 35 pages of his 1906 Symbolic Logic, MacColl sought
to establish the analogy between truth-values in compound propositions and
the laws of signs in algebra. For example, the conjunction True and False is
False in logic, and positive times negative is negative in algebra. MacColl, as
[Grattan-Guinness 1998, 7] also notes, used superscripts, with “P ” and “N” to
define appropriate propositions such as
(x − 3)P = (x > 3),and (x − 3)N = (x < 3)
with “=” serving as equality by definition—in addition to its use as arithmetical
equality and equivalence between propositions [MacColl 1906, 107]. But, while
change of limits in multiple integrals, where inequalities such as in (1) were
used to state that a variable lay between given values, and as Peirce said,
MacColl’s procedures were “exceedingly ingenious”; but for some of the more
elementary needs, such as obtaining the roots of a quadratic equation [MacColl
1906, 112–113], were far more complicated than necessary. 10
MacColl’s variables, as presented in the fifth installment of “The calculus
of equivalent statements” [MacColl 1896, 157), are similar in several respects
to Peirce’s assertion of possibility. In the more mature development of his
theory of modal propositional logic, as found in the sixth installment of his
10. The fact however that MacColl’s innovations with integrals on this score ac-
tually are less efficient than the standard procedures, and the confusions which he
exhibited with regard to questions of defining the use of zero in expressions involv-
ing differentials as ratios df/dx between a function f and its respective variable x,
indicate that, whereas MacColl was well within the French tradition of Lagrange
of treating the theory of limits algebraically, he was not familiar with the rigorous
Cauchy-Weierstrassian reformulation of the theory of limits in terms of ε − δ nota-
tion, in which a careful distinction is made between [absolute] zero and a very small
ε approaching, but not attaining zero, in relation to the change, from either the
positive or negative side, of δ where the limit of f(x) as x approaches a is L, i.e.
lim
x→a
f(x) = L if for every number ε > 0, there exists a corresponding number δ > 0
such that ∣ f(x)−L ∣< ε whenever 0 <∣ x−a ∣< δ, despite Weierstrass’s students helping
to disseminate this across Europe from the 1870s forward.
Grattan-Guinness also takes note of MacColl’s weakness in the history of mathemat-
ics, in this case again with respect to the meaning of dy/dx; Grattan-Guinness tells
us that in a letter that MacColl adressed to Russell on 18 December 1909 summariz-
ing “an argument about limits in a paper published posthumously in Mind [MacColl
1910], he wondered why the notation “dy/dx” could not be read as a ratio of in-
finitesimals [. . . ], apparently unaware that this was exactly how Leibniz introduced it
(with his own sense of infinitesimal) and his successors used it [Bos 1974].” [Grattan-
Guinness 1998, 10].
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“Symbolic reasoning,” these variables became for MacColl existentially defined
assertions; there MacColl wrote that:
Firstly, when any symbol A denotes an individual ; then, any intel-
ligible statement φ(A), containing the symbol A, implies that the
individual represented by A has a symbolic existence; but whether
the statement φ(A) implies that the individual represented by A
has a real existence depends upon the context. Secondly, when
a symbol A denotes a class, then the intelligible statement φ(A)
containing any symbol A implies that the whole class A has a
symbolic existence; but whether the statement φ(A) implies that
the class A is wholly real, or wholly unreal, or partly real and partly
unreal, depends upon the context. [MacColl 1905, 77]
Bain’s conception of Boole’s principal contribution to the syllogistic logic is
that, with the addition of the axiom that equals added to equals yield equal
sums, and that, if A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is
greater than C, he “draws the Syllogism under the axiom that suffices for the
reduction of equations,” he “assumes that the analogy of the logical method
and the algebraical is sufficiently close to allow of the substitution” [Bain 1870,
164]. Boole’s additions to the syllogism, then consist in drawing the details of
the algebraic representation of logical propositions; these are adumbrated by
Bain in a few lines short of seventeen pages [Bain 1870, 190–207].
Examining the details of MacColl’s major productions, we find that the
first two papers on “The calculus of equivalent statements” [MacColl 1877-
1878a-b] and his first paper on “Symbolical reasoning” [MacColl 1880a] present
a calculus of propositions which has essentially the properties of Peirce’s, albeit
without Π and Σ operators to serve, as they did for Peirce (and then Schröder),
as logical product and logical sum, doing duty for the universal and existential
quantifiers respectively. It is, therefore, in fact a calculus of propositions, like
the Boolean (two-valued) algebra of logic with which we are familiar. Lewis
[Lewis 1918, 108] believed that the date of these papers indicates that MacColl
arrived at their content independently of Peirce’s work along the same lines.
In his Symbolic Logic and its Applications (1906), MacColl’s attention is di-
rected to truth-functional logic, and hence the fundamental symbols represent
propositional functions rather than propositions. It is also here that MacColl
examines a trivalent logic. Instead of just the two traditional truth values true
and false, we also have certain, impossible and variable (not certain and not
impossible). These are indicated by the exponents τ, ι, ε, η and θ respectively.
The result is a highly complex system, the fundamental ideas and procedures
of which suggest somewhat Lewis’s system of strict implication to be set forth
in Chapter V of his Survey of Symbolic Logic (1918). The logical theory of
MacColl’s Symbolic Logic is neither mathematically nor logically equivalent to
the Boole-Schröder calculus. We will return to a consideration of the ques-
tion of the relation between Peirce’s trivalent logic and MacColl’s four-valued,
“three-dimensional” logic.
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One of the questions of priority which would appear to be problematic is
whether Peirce or MacColl first proclaimed that Boole’s calculus was amenable
to alternative interpretations. It is well known that Peirce allowed his “claw” of
illation to function either as material implication or as class inclusion. Indeed,
one of the criticisms which both Peano and Russell leveled against the Boole-
Schröder calculus was that it neither offered nor provided a basis for distin-
guishing between classes and propositions. Russell’s criticism of the equivocal
use by Peirce and Schröder of one connective for both inclusion and implica-
tion occurred first in his “Sur la logique des relations avec des applications à
la théorie des séries” [Russell 1901], and recurs, in somewhat different guise,
in the Principles of Mathematics [Russell 1903, 24]. Frege’s similar criticsm
of Schröder occurs in his review [Frege 1895] of Schröder’s Vorlesungen über
die Algebra der Logic. Likewise, in his Arithmetices Principia, Nova Methodo
Exposita [Peano 1889, V], Peano laid stress on the difference between set el-
ementhood (or class membership) on the one hand and material implication
on the other. From the perspective of Russell and Peano, it accrues to the
disadvantage of MacColl that, although he placed his greater emphasis on the
logic of propositions, he nevertheless allowed for the interpretation of his cal-
culus both with respect to propositional logic and the class calculus. By the
same token, it accrued to his advantage, from the perspective of Peirce and
Schröder, that he imposed no constraints between these interpretations. For
Peirce’s illation and Schröder’s equivalent Subsumption (e), they more prob-
ably initially had in mind for this connective general inclusion, that is, any
relation that is transitive, reflexive, and asymmetrical, rather than material
implication specifically [Houser 1987, 431, 437 n. 6]. However, its interpreta-
tion, as either inclusion or implication, could vary, according to the specific
context in which it occurred. The potential for multiple interpretations of
the kind made by Peirce for his illation and Schröder’s subsumption could be
justified, prior to Cantor’s development of set theory by the pre-Cantorian
treatment of collections, in terms of the part-whole relationship since it is only
after the development of the concepts of set membership and class inclusion
and the consequent distinction between the two notions that it made sense to
distinguish between these two kinds of relation or that such a distinction had a
purpose. 11 MacColl was among those who, like Peano and Russell, criticized
Peirce’s illation and Schröder’s Subsumption for conflating implication and
inclusion [MacColl 1906, 78]. But this is reflective of MacColl’s inability to
appreciate that algebraic logic is concerned with the general algebraic struc-
ture of equations as relations, rather than with propositional logic specifically,
which was MacColl’s concern. Whether, however, MacColl’s myopia in this re-
gard is rooted in his comparative isolation from the mathematical community
working in algebraic logic, or something else, is perhaps moot. What is salient
11. For a philosophical approach to the history (and “pre-history”) of set theory
and the difference between the Aristotle-inspired conception of infinity, based on the
whole-part relation, and concept of infinity in Cantorian set theory as based upon
the element-set relation, see, e.g. [Tiles 1989].
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is that this is indicative of the primary difference between the “Booleans” on
the one hand and MacColl on the other.
Nathan Houser [Houser 1989, l] has noted that Peirce reported on
14 December 1880 that he had received copies of papers from a number of
authors “on various logical and psychological subjects,” and that among those
whose works he received was MacColl. What Houser does not specify is which
of MacColl’s writings he had received, or when, but we may certainly conclude
that Peirce must at the very least have known enough about MacColl’s “The
calculus of equivalent statements” by 1880 to permit his reference to it in his
own “On the algebra of logic” and explicit citation of the second installment
of that series. Houser [Houser 1989, lix] also notes that “Peirce had made
plans to visit with Hugh MacColl in Boulogne-sur-Mer, which he probably
did near the beginning of his stay,” which would indicate the occurrence of a
personal meeting between Peirce and MacColl some time in mid-May 1883
[MacColl 1883].
In 1883, Studies in Logic [Peirce 1883] appeared, edited by Peirce and con-
taining contributions by Peirce and his Johns Hopkins University students. In
the “Preface,” Peirce noted that between 1864 and 1877, Boole in the Laws of
Thought, Jevons in Pure Logic [Jevons 1864], Robert Grassmann (1815-1901)
in his Die Formenlehre oder Mathematik [Grassmann 1872a], and, presumably
more explicitly, in his Begriffslehre oder Logik [Grassmann 1872b], Schröder
in his Operationskreis [Schröder 1877], MacColl in the “The calculus of equiv-
alent statements,” and Venn all, independently of one another, proposed the
use of the addition sign for combining different terms into an aggregate, mean-
ing that, whether they disagreed upon whether logical addition should be
interpreted as inclusive or exclusive disjunction, they all nevertheless agree
that logical addition is a disjunction [Peirce 1883, iii]. Boole and Venn alone
among them, he notes, argue in favor or logical addition as exclusive disjunc-
tion [Peirce 1883, iv]. Peirce also adds that both he and MacColl also “find it
absolutely necessary” to introduce as well a new sign to represent existence.
Boole’s notation permits assertions that “some description of a thing does not
exist,” but does not allow the possibility of asserting that anything does ex-
ist [Peirce 1883, iv]. Moreover, the use of the sign of equality, as used by
Boole, in expressions such as xy = 0 of the E-proposition “No xs are ys” was
reformulated in the Laws of Thought [Boole 1854, 61–64] as y = ν(1 − x), as-
serting with “No xs are ys” and being converted to “All xs are not ys.” But, as
Augustus De Morgan [De Morgan 1842a, 13], [De Morgan 1842b, 288] pointed
out equality is a complex relation, so that the expression “A = B” asserts both
that all As are Bs and that all Bs are As. For these reasons, Peirce wrote,
he and McColl “make use of signs of inclusion and of non-inclusion” [Peirce
1883, iv]. Peirce writes “Griffin Aquatic” to mean that some animals
are not aquatic, or that a non-aquatic animal does exist. McColl’s notation is
not, he tells us, essentially different. At this point, Peirce reiterates a common
complaint of logicians of the day, that there is neither a uniform system of
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notation nor a uniform determination of the most basic propositions and the
respective relations or logical connectives holding between them.
The contributions to Studies in Logic by Christine Ladd-Franklin [Ladd-
Franklin 1883] and Oscar Howard Mitchell (1851-1889) [Mitchell 1883], oper-
ating with simplifications of Boole’s logic by Schröder and MacColl, helped, in
Peirce’s estimate to improve the Boolean logic further, and found it “surprising
to see with what facility their methods yield solutions of problems more in-
tricate and difficult than any that have hitherto been proposed” [Peirce 1883,
v]. Ladd-Franklin [Ladd-Franklin 1883, 23], in considering the copula for her
algebra of logic, noted that whereas Jevons considered the two propositions
“The sea-serpent is not found in the water” and “The sea-serpent is not found
out of the water” to be mutually contradictory, MacColl, Venn, and Peirce
were led to consider the existential import of propositions, asserting that a
universal proposition can be contradicted only by a particular proposition,
and a particular proposition contradicted only by a universal propositions, on
the basis of which they concluded that the two propositions “The sea-serpent
is not found in the water” and “The sea-serpent is not found out of the water”
taken together allowed the inference that sea-serpents do not exist. It is in
turn on this basis that Peirce held that, from the formal algebraic perspective,
there is no distinction to be made between hypothetical and categorical propo-
sitions, and that the Barbara syllogism can be reformulated as ((S M) &
(M P )) (S P ). Another difference between Jevons on the one hand and
MacColl (and Peirce) on the other that Ladd-Franklin [Ladd-Franklin 1883,
24] makes is that, while for Jevons, a letter c is a representation of an indefi-
nite class symbol, every letter used by MacColl denotes a distinct proposition,
and as MacColl’s a ∶ b states that if some object is an a, it also expresses that
any statement a implies statement b, as does Peirce’s a b. The singular ad-
vantage that Ladd-Franklin claims for Peirce’s “ ” over MacColl’s “ ∶” is that
the former is, in its graphic design, asymmetrical, and therefore more adept
at designating the asymmetrical nature of the relation which it is designed to
express. Ladd-Franklin does not address the historical question of priority,
or even the broader question of the direction of influence between Peirce and
MacColl in “On the algebra of logic,” but is chiefly concerned to explore the
comparative merits of the offerings of the contemporary algebraic logicans, and
to set forth her own contributions in accordance with what she was learning in
Peirce’s Johns Hopkins courses. (Indeed, the ahistoricality of mathematicians
engaged in leading-edge research is, proverbially, nearly universal.)
In her discussion on the methods for elimination of superfluous or redun-
dant terms form logical equations, 12 Ladd-Franklin notes [Ladd-Franklin 1883,
39] that there is a significant difference between the Boolean and classical
squares of oppositions, and in particular addresses the question of the exis-
tential import of propositions that was a major issue in MacColl’s published
corpus (as well as an issue in his exchanges on the subject with Bertrand
12. For the historical background and exposition of elemination of terms in formulas
of algebraic logic, see [Green 1991].
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Russell). As we know, the modern or Boolean square of opposition and the
determination of which inferences are valid rests upon the acceptance of empty
sets, whereas the traditional (Aristotelian) square and the determination of the
validity of inferences presupposes that there are no empty classes involved. In
explaining that: “Those syllogisms in which a particular conclusion is drawn
from two universal premises become illogical when the universal proposition
is taken as not implying the existence of its terms,” [Ladd-Franklin 1883,
39], Ladd-Franklin cites both Peirce’s “On the algebra of logic” [Peirce 1880]
and MacColl’s “Symbolical reasoning” [MacColl 1880a]. In this particular in-
stance, the two articles being nearly contemporaneous, no inference whatever
is ventured by Ladd-Franklin concerning possible influence of either author on
the other. What is patently clear is that Ladd-Franklin regarded Peirce and
MacColl as intellectual companions, sharing many of the same concepts and
methods in their respective, if presumably independent, development of logic,
and both superior to the techniques devised by Jevons. With this evaluation
in mind regarding the techniques and their applications to the problems which
she considers, Ladd-Franklin adopts those, in her own work, of MacColl, and,
finding MacColl’s superior to that of Jevons, but more complicated than the
alternative that she offers in its place, she writes:
Complicated problems are solved with far more ease by
Mr. McColl than by Mr. Jevons; but that is not because the
method of excluded combinations is not, when properly treated,
the easiest method. A method of implications, such as that of
Mr. McColl, is without doubt more natural than the other when
universal premises are given in the affirmative form, but the dis-
tinction which it preserves between subject and predicate intro-
duces a rather greater degree of complexity into the rules for work-
ing it. [Ladd-Franklin 1883, 51]
Likewise, Mitchell remarks that, apart from the notational difference between
Peirce’s “ ” over MacColl’s “:” if symbolizing the copula, they both “have
given algebraic methods in logic, in which the terms of these propositions are
allowed to remain on both sides of the copula” [Mitchell 1883, 96]. Mitchell
adds the additional information that:
Mr. Hugh McColl, in his papers on logic in the “Proceedings of
the London Mathematical Society” [Vol. IX, et seq.], has been
using a notation for the copula identical in meaning with that of
Mr. Peirce. He uses a colon to denote implication, instead of .
Mr. Peirce has recently told me that Mr. McColl justifies his use
of the colon by its mathematical meaning as a sign of division.
Thus Barbara and Celarent are:
m ∶ p m ∶ p¯
s ∶m s ∶m
∴ s ∶ p ∴ s ∶ p¯,
and the analogy to division is obvious. [Mitchell 1883, 101]
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Peirce’s choice of notation is dictated by the breakdown of the analogy upon
which MacColl’s selection of notation depends. As Mitchell explains:
[T]his analogy exists only in the two universal moods of the first
figure. Thus Cesare and Festino are
p ∶ m¯ p ∶ m¯
s ∶m s ÷ m¯
∴ s ∶ p¯ ∴ s ÷ p,
where ÷ is the negative copula. And the analogy to division is
wanting. [Mitchell 1883, 101–102]
By far the best known of MacColl’s work is his advocacy, and development, of
nonclassical logic, that is, his three-dimensional, four-valued logic. There are
arguments as to whether MacColl’s extension of propositional logic should be
considered as a modal propositional logic or as a trivalent propositional logic,
since it is open to question whether his classifications true and false, certain,
impossible and variable were intended to be truth values or modal operators.
MacColl’s mature system of modal logic was developed in the years 1895-1905
[Astroh & Read 1998, ii] but can be traced back to at least as far back as
MacColl’s series of papers in Mind on “Symbolical reasoning” [MacColl 1880a,
54], in which MacColl presents the denial of a′ + b as the equivalent to ab′ as a
definition of certainty or actuality (see [Goldblatt 2006, 4]). Fania Cavaliere ar-
gued that, working with his operators τ, ι, ε, η, θ to express true, false, certain,
impossible, and variable respectively, and defining “p implies q” as “p and not-q
is impossible,” MacColl developed a modal propositional logic, thereby antic-
ipating enroute C. I. Lewis’s definition of strict implication [Cavaliere 1996].
Peter Simons [Simons 1998] argues, against Nicholas Rescher [Rescher 1969,
4], that MacColl’s logic cannot be considered a many-valued logic. It is more
properly understood as a modal probability logic. 13 MacColl for his part ac-
counted the failure by Boole and Peirce (and Schröder) to distinguish between
an argument (or its contents) and its probability as a serious flaw [Hailperin
1996, 132–134]. But this effectively reduces proofs from distinctions between
validity and invalidity to degrees of validity. And while it is indeed crucial
to distinguish the contents of an argument and its truth-value, a distinction
which is already present in Peirce when he introduced truth functional anal-
ysis (beginning in 1884 and perhaps stimulated by Christine Ladd-Franklin
[Ladd-Franklin 1883, 62ff.] and her study of Jevons [Jevons 1877, 162ff.]), 14
13. In more recent terms, we would be more inclined to suggest that many-valued
logics, modal logics, and probability logics all share the same algebraic structure, as
generalized Galois logics (ggl), in which the main connective is a fusion of implication
and some other specialized reflexive, transitive, and asymmetrical relation, with the
generalized connective ○ being such that a ≤ b ⇔ a ○ b for any ggl. See [Bimbó &
Dunn 2008].
14. [Houser 1991, 20] suggests that Peirce’s study of truth-functional logic may
have arisen from consideration of dilemmatic reasoning and truth-functional analysis
of material implication, in 1884 (MS 527, Part II of “algebra of logic”; published in
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by restricting the elements of his logic to propositions, MacColl does not have
the capability of interpreting the elements of his system as either terms, sets
(or classes), or propositions in the same way that Peirce and Schröder could.
Likewise, he does not have the capability to take his basic connective, depend-
ing upon context, as Peirce and Schröder were able to do, as either the copula,
or class inclusion (or set membership), or implication (or inference). 15
What is not in dispute is that, as we have already noted, MacColl placed
the emphasis in logic upon propositions, and insisted that the basic logical
relation is implication between propositions, rather than class inclusion. He
investigated the details in his two series of papers “The calculus of equivalent
statements” and “Symbolic reasoning,” devising a “pure [propositional] logic.”
The same questions could perhaps be raised concerning the trivalent logics
devised by Peirce, as to whether there is a modal content to the third truth-
value. What is evident is that truth-values were paramount, regardless of
how those truth values might be modally interpreted. In discussing Russell’s
criticisms of MacColl’s definition of variables, Max Harold Fisch (1900-1995),
who devoted much of his professional career to the study of Peirce, and Atwell
Rufus Turquette, noted that MacColl’s variables are similar to Peirce’s concept
of possibility [Fisch & Turquette 1966, 80].
For our purposes, however, the primary question is not concerning the
interpretation of the classification of propositions or the issue of priority, but
rather the issue of the possible influence on Peirce of MacColl’s work on non-
classical propositions and their logic. Bertrand Russell, as is too well known
to record here in any detail, engaged in debates with MacColl on these issues
(as well as many others) in the first few years of the twentieth century. It
is debatable whether or not Russell countenanced non-classical logics. The
general consensus is that he did not. What is probably indisputable is that,
whatever consideration (if any), whether positive or negative, that Russell gave
to non-classical logics, was stimulated in all probability by his encounters on
the matter with MacColl, rather than through the offices of any other source. 16
Fisch and Turquette wrote that: “It would be interesting to know exactly
what circumstances stimulated Peirce’s successful solution of the problem of
[Peirce 1993, 107–109]), along with his rejection of syllogistic. In “On the algebra
of logic: A contribution to the philosophy of notation” [Peirce 1885] Peirce used
his connective ( ) for material implication and had introduced truth-functional
analysis.
15. For example, in [Pierce 1870], Pierce introduced the same sign, “illation” ( )
to represent both implication and class inclusion. He was criticized for this by Russell
[Russell 1903, 187]; and Schröder too, following Peirce, used the same symbol, sub-
sumption (e), for both class inclusion and implication, for which he, in turn, was
criticized by Frege [Frege 1895].
16. See in particular [Anellis 2009] on the sources from which Russell encoun-
tered nonclassical logic. See [Anellis 2009, 153–218], especially § 11: “Peirce again,
and MacColl and Bradley” [Anellis 2009,187–193] and § 12: “More on MacColl and
Bradley” [Anellis 2009,193–195].
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triadic logic” [Fisch & Turquette 1966, 82]. In the absence of concrete extant
evidence, Fisch was left to conjecture whether, and if so, when and where,
his thinking in terms of the possibility of developing a non-classical logic may
have been stimulated by MacColl. Thus, Fisch and Turquette wrote that:
For example, could it have been that Peirce had been following the
controversy inMind between Bertrand Russell and Hugh MacColl,
prompted by Russell’s (1906) review of MacColl’s (1906) Symbolic
Logic and MacColl’s (1907) reply? If so, late in 1908 or early in
1909, Peirce might have seen MacColl’s (1908) note entitled “ ‘If’
and ‘Imply” ’ which had appeared in January 1908. 17 In this note,
MacColl considers the difference between his and Russell’s treat-
ment of implication. He indicates that for “nearly thirty years”
he has been “vainly trying to convince” logicians of the errors in-
volved in equating “implication” with what is now called “Russell’s
material implication.” MacColl then asks the following question:
Is it too much to hope that this test case will at last
open the eyes of logicians to the necessity of accepting
my three-fold division of statements (ε, η, θ) with all its
consequences?
[Fisch & Turquette 1966, 82–83]
Fisch and Turquette go on to suggest that it would be speculative to attempt to
determine the direction of influences between Peirce and MacColl with respect
at least to Peirce’s triadic logic and MacColl’s three-dimensional logic [Fisch
& Turquette 1966, 83]. They can confidently assert that they were interested
in one another’s work for a considerable period of time, and they quote a letter
to Peirce dated May 16, 1883 in which MacColl wrote that: “It will be a great
pleasure indeed to me if you can stay a little while in Boulogne on your way
to England. It is not often that I have the opportunity of making the personal
acquaintance of my correspondents in logic and mathematics” [MacColl 1883].
Much later, in a draft of a letter dated November 16, 1906, Peirce writes to
MacColl that:
Although my studies in symbolic logic have differed from yours
in that my aim has not been to apply the system to the working
out of problems, as yours has, but to aid in the study of logic
itself, nevertheless I have always thought that you alone, so far as
I know, except myself, have understood how the matter ought to
be treated by making the elements propositions or predicates and
not common nouns. [Peirce 1906]
Peirce concludes by noting that he has learned of a new book just published
on symbolic logic which was reviewed in the November first issue of Nature
[Anonymous 1906b], and hints that he should like to receive a copy. This
17. Fisch and Turquette are clearly referring here to the first of two parts of
MacColl’s [MacColl 1908].
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letter is also cited by Michael Astroh [Astroh 1998, 170] as evidence that
Peirce was in agreement with MacColl that the traditional account by logi-
cians of subject and predicate in terms of general nouns was erroneous when
reflected in logical form. 18
The book to which Peirce refers, is, of course, MacColl’s Symbolic Logic
[MacColl 1906]. The account of MacColl’s book begins: “WHETHER
Mr. MacColl is the Athanasius of symbolic logic or only its Ishmael, the fact
remains that he seems unable to come to an agreement with other exponents
of the subject. But he contends that his system in the elastic adaptability
of its notation bears very much the same relation to other systems (including
the ordinary formal logic of our text-books) as algebra bears to arithmetic”
[Anonymous 1906b, 1]. 19 After noting that its contents had been previously
published in journals, the reviewer continues that points on which MacColl lays
18. In light of the claims by Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), referring to his
Principles of Logic [Bradley 1883], as expressed in his letter to Bertrand Russell of
27 September 1914, that “I always have believed that in 1883 in the Logic I pointed
out a number of inferences which fell outside the category of subject and attribute
and pointed out again that there was nevertheless a form in every possible inference,”
quoted in [Keen 1971, 10]. As Francisco A. Rodríguez-Consuegra made patently
clear, Bradley, as much as Russell, was “an enemy of this [subject-predicate] mode
of analysis,” and he explains that, for Bradley, the subject-predicate analysis “was
the basis for traditional logic, and therefore to be rejected,” and that his writings
“contain many examples of this rejection,” because, judgments as relational, the only
distinctions that apply between subject and predicate are grammatical [Rodríguez-
Consuegra 1992, 95]. See also [Chalmers & Griffin 1997].
While a discussion of interactions of MacColl and Bradley, MacColl and Russell,
and Bradley and Russell are quite tangential to the discussion of MacColl’s influences
on Peirce and Schröder, I suggest that it might nevertheless be useful to also examine
what influence MacColl’s work in logic may have had on Bradley, and to investigate
Bradley’s studies of MacColl’s work. Exchanges of correspondence between Bradley
and MacColl, and between Russell and Bradley have been published in [Keene 1999].
Regardless of the issue of the connections between Bradley and MacColl, these
discussions between Peirce and MacColl, and Bradley and Russell, ought, when taken
collectively, dispell the claims, perpetuated by much of twentieth-century historiogra-
phy of logic, that it was Frege who, single-handedly, broke the Aristotelian tradition
of treating logical propositions exclusively in subject-predicate form. This does not,
of course, contradict the role or significance of Frege in replacing the subject-predicate
syntax with the function-theoretic syntax of mathematical logic.
An anonymous reviewer of MacColl’s Symbolic Logic in the Educational Times
[Anonymous 1906a] remarked on the significance of MacColl’s opposition to the
subject-predicate form in logical syntax. It would be interesting, if perhaps also fruit-
less, to speculate whether this anonymous author might actually have been Peirce,
or Bradley, or Russell.
19. MacColl’s book was considered in that review along with The Development
of Symbolic Logic [Shearman 1906] of Arthur Thomas Shearman (1866-1937); An
Introduction to Logic [Joseph 1906] of Horace William Brindley Joseph (1867-1943);
and Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic [Baldwin 1906] of James Mark Baldwin
(1861-1934).
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“considerable stress, and in which he does not command the uniform ascent of
the other symbolic logicians,” are:
(a) that he takes statements and not terms to be in all cases
and necessarily the ultimate constituents of symbolic reasoning;
(b) that he goes quite beyond the ordinary notation of the sym-
bolists in classifying propositions according to such attributes
as true, false, certain, impossible, variable; (c) that in regard
to the existential import of propositions, while other symbolists
define the null class o as containing no members, and under-
stand it as contained in every class, real or unreal, he, on the
other hand, defines it as consisting of the null or unreal mem-
bers o1, o2, o3,&c., and considers it to be extended over every real
class. . . [Anonymous 1906b, 1]
The anonymous reviewer for Nature does not name the “other symbolic lo-
gicians” from whom MacColl differs on these three issues, although, since a
criticism by Shearman is mentioned by the reviewer in the context of the dis-
cussion of Shearman’s Development of Symbolic Logic, we can be assured that
he, at least, is one of the dissenters had in mind by the reviewer, it being
noted that “the doctrines of Prof. Jevons and Mr. MacColl are subjected” by
Shearman “to some severe criticisms. . . ” [Anonymous 1906b, 1]. It is noted in
particular that Shearman “rejects all attempts to deal with any but assertoric
propositions, and holds that if Mr. MacColl wishes to work with such data as
probable and variable he should introduce new terms” [Anonymous 1906b, 1].
Fisch and Turquette conclude, with respect to their work on nonclassical
logic, that: “As far as it is now known, however, there is not sufficient con-
crete evidence available to make possible an accurate account of the exact
relationship between MacColl’s work in three-dimensional logic and Peirce’s
investigations of triadic logic. The solution to this problem will have to await
future historical research” [Fisch & Turquette 1966, 83]. We are obliged then
to turn, on this matter, to the findings of Rahman and Redmond [Rahman &
Redmond 2008] and others to glean what we can, or to hope that new extant
evidence will appear.
The question of MacColl’s influences on Peirce leading to Peirce’s con-
sideration of the possibility of devising a nonclassical logic, and then to his
efforts to do so, are indirect at best. We look in vain for an instance in which
Peirce states that he was led in this direction by reading MacColl’s work. And,
as questions of influence can be shadowy, the best we can do is examine the
extant written evidence.
We know that Peirce had already considered paradoxes of self-reference in
“Grounds of the validity of the laws of logic” [Peirce 1869], in particular dealing
with the ramifications of the proposition “This proposition is false,” and offer-
ing an analysis closely akin to that of Paul of Venice (Paulus Venetus; Paolo
di Venezia; 1369-1429), but giving a proof of assumptions that Paul merely
assumed, and demonstrating that the analysis of the underlying premise is in-
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adequate, namely that it states merely that the proposition is false, whereas,
in reality, the underlying premise also includes the presupposition that the
statement is true. Here, perhaps, we can see the roots of the trivalent logic
that Peirce eventually devised beginning in the 1890s.
We also know that Peirce also raised the question of the possibility of
developing non-classical logics as early as the 1890s. He wrote that by 1895
he had entertained the idea of toying with, and altering, the laws of logic
and even of doing without some of them, as he suggested in a letter to Judge
Francis Calvin Russell (1838-ca.1920) [no relation to Bertrand Russell], quoted
by Paul Calvin Carus (1852-1919) in [Carus 1910a, 44–45]. In that letter,
Peirce wrote that “before I took up the general study of relatives, I made some
investigation into the consequences of supposing the laws of logic to be different
from what they are.” He did not consistently, persistently or thoroughly follow
through, although he left manuscript notes in which his “tinkering” appears.
On the other hand, Peirce left no doubt, as Carus assured his readers in
“Non-Aristotelian logic” [Carus 1910b], that he did not, as some readers of the
original Carus paper [Carus 1910a, 44–45] might have been led to surmise,
consider the possibility of non-Aristotelian logics to be in any wise “lunatic.”
To the contrary, Peirce indicated that had he deigned to pursue the issue, he
might have gained some insight into features of logic that might be overlooked
(Peirce quoted at [Carus 1910b, 158]). Even earlier, George Boole, in his Laws
of Thought, after proving on the previous page that x2 = x, showed that x2 = x
is impossible, and added, in the attached footnote, that, had it been accepted,
it could have opened the possibility of a non-bivalent logic in which “the law of
thought might have been be different from what it is” [Boole 1854, 50]. Peirce
was certainly familiar with Boole’s Laws of Thought, and could have been
thinking of Boole’s footnote. His own comment (as quoted by Carus [Carus
1910a, 45]) of entertaining the consequences of “supposing the laws of logic to
be different from what they are,” is clearly an echo of Boole’s similar remark.
This leaves open the possibility that Boole, together with MacColl, or even
possibly Boole alone, could have led Peirce to take seriously the possibility for
constructing non-classical logics.
Consider as examples of Peirce’s “tinkerings” with the laws of logic the
fragments of Peirce’s manuscript Logic Notebook (1865-1909), in particular
those dating from at least early 1909 if not somewhat earlier (MS 339:440–
441, 443; see [Peirce 1849-1914]), which had been examined by Fisch and
Turquette On the basis of this work. Fisch and Turquette [Fisch & Turquette
1966, 72] concluded that by 23 February 1909 Peirce was able to extend his
truth-theoretic matrices to three-valued logic, thereby anticipating both Jan
Łukasiewicz (1878-1956), in “O logice trójwartosciowej” [Łukasiewicz 1921],
and Emil Leon Post (1897-1954), in “Introduction to a general theory of ele-
mentary propositions” [Post 1921], by a decade in developing the truth table
device for triadic logic and multiple-valued logics respectively.
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Peirce’s influences on MacColl
The influence which Peirce and Schröder had upon MacColl, on the other
hand, was comparatively tenuous. In particular, as Ivor Grattan-Guinness
[Grattan-Guinness 1998, 11] noted, MacColl used Peirce’s symbol for implica-
tion in a passage of his book, where he also noted Schröder’s [MacColl 1906,
78–80], but he did not discuss or use their systems. We may attribute this at
least in part to MacColl’s comparative isolation from the mainstream of the
logical research community and from his unfamiliarity with many of the lan-
guages in which some of the work of active researchers was being carried out.
Thus, for example, Grattan-Guinness [Grattan-Guinness 1998, 10] noted that
lack of Italian left MacColl unable to read the work of Peano and his school,
while his lack of German rendered him unable to take advantage of the work
of Schröder, although MacColl attended and delivered a talk [MacColl 1901]
at the same International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900 at which
Schröder also spoke [Schröder 1901]. 20 Thus, in a letter to Russell of 28 June
1901 (quoted in [Russell 1993, 239–240]), MacColl professes his ignorance of
the logic of relations and, alluding to the first two volumes of the Vorlesungen
über die Algebra der Logik [Schröder 1890-1905], his inability to read the work
of Schröder because he cannot read German. The congress was MacColl’s
best, and perhaps last, opportunity to get his work before an influential group
of mathematical logicians, and his talk, “La logique symbolique et ses applica-
tions,” provided them with a survey of his logical system. MacColl made no
reference in his own work to the work of Schröder, nor to Schröder’s congress
paper.
The influences which Peirce and Schröder had on MacColl were, at best,
minimal. He was aware of their work, at one point using Peirce’s notation for
implication in his own Symbolic Logic [MacColl 1906, 78–80] and taking note
of the existence of Schröder’s work, but failing even at that juncture to provide
his own exposition, or even summary, of that work. MacColl indeed went to
great lengths to differentiate his work from that of Peirce and Schröder. The
entirety of his “A note on Prof. C. S. Peirce’s probability notation of 1867”
[MacColl 1881] is devoted to establishing that any similarity between his own
notation for implication and Peirce’s illation is purely coincidental; thus, the
Secretaries of the London Mathematical Society assert, in MacColl’s name,
that MacColl, referring to his article “The calculus of equivalent statements
(fourth paper)” [MacColl 1880b], has shown that:
the apparent coincidence of notation, in some few particulars, be-
tween himself and Prof. Peirce, was entirely accidental, and that
20. [Lovett 1900-1901] is a summary of the the talks on mathematics presented
at the Congress. MacColl’s and Schröder’s talks and discussions are summarized at
[Lovett 1900-1901, 166–168], with Couturat raising questions for MacColl regarding
the differences between Boole’s treatment of probability and MacColl’s [Lovett 1900-
1901, 176–177]. If there were any discussions between MacColl and Schröder, or even
whether either attended the other’s talk, is not recorded in
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Mr. McColl was not at that time acquainted with Prof. Peirce’s pa-
per. In fact, the revised fourth paper (“On Probability Notation,”
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Vol. xi., no 163)
was communicated to the Society about nine months before the
Author read Prof. Peirce’s paper. [MacColl 1881]
The assumption that we may infer is that, whereas Peirce and Schröder were
willing to acknowledge debts to MacColl, this willingness was not, evidently,
reciprocated. Alternatively, we might just as easily take MacColl at face value
and allow the possibility that he was largely uninfluenced by either Peirce or
Schröder, or, at the very least that, if he was influenced by either or both,
he failed to recognize it because his conception of logical systems and their
underlying structures were significantly different from theirs, namely, that
whereas he considered implication to be fundamental to logical form and the
basic syntactic elements of logic were propositions, Peirce and Schröder consid-
ered illation and subsumption respectively, understood as generalized reflexive,
transitive, assymmetrical relations, to be fundamental to the algebraic struc-
ture of logical systems and the basic syntactic elements to be the relata, i.e.
the elements of the relations, interpretable as either terms, sets, classes, or
propositions, depending upon the particular requirements of the system in its
application.
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